A Quarter Century of the Stockholm Convention

To commemorate this 25th anniversary in a fitting manner, we spoke with JUDr. Jiří Hlaváček, Ph.D., a prominent Czech diplomat, who in an interview explains the circumstances surrounding the convention’s creation and the broader context of environmental pollution and the steps taken to address it in the Czech Republic, and also shares his international work experience at the United Nations Environment Programme, says Kateřina Šebková, director of the Stockholm Convention Regional Center.

In 2001, the Czech Republic was on its way to joining the EU, but at the same time it was grappling with a number of environmental problems and legacy issues. Was this the main motivation for the Czech Republic to sign the convention? If not, how would you describe the atmosphere at that time in the area of multilateral relations?

The Czech Republic’s multilateral environmental relations at the beginning of the 21st century, and thus also in 2001, can be characterized by three dimensions:

1) European regional and subregional, i.e., the EU, the Visegrad Group, and trilateral and multilateral cooperation agreements in the Central European region,

2) broader European cooperation, i.e., within the framework of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, the Council of Europe, and their international legal instruments, and cooperation among economically advanced countries, i.e., the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),

3) global, i.e., the UN and its specialized agencies, programs, and commissions, global environmental agreements (MEAs), and initiatives.

These three dimensions influenced and complemented one another, but sometimes also competed for political and financial support from both the national government and the Ministry of the Environment.

Following the start of negotiations on membership in the European Union in 1998 and then the opening of the environment chapter in December 1999, the Czech Republic’s multilateral environmental relations focused on fulfilling the requirements for full membership in this European multilateral integration organization. The political leadership of the state also directed its priority attention to this area.

At the Ministry of the Environment and, concurrently, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic, we gradually succeeded in convincing both political leadership and expert departments that it was necessary to make the most of the process of preparing for accession to the European Union to also advance the Czech Republic’s position more ambitiously in international environmental relations at the broader European regional level (UNECE) and on a global scale (UNEP, MEAs). After all, the transposition and harmonization of EC/EU legislation, along with the creation of the necessary institutional and implementation capacities, could be utilized—with minor modifications—to fulfill obligations under international environmental treaties.

Thus, the signing of the Protocol on Persistent Organic Pollutants to the UNECE Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (UN ECE CLRTAP) in June 1998 in Aarhus, Denmark, and the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants on May 23, 2001, in Stockholm, Sweden, by the Czech Republic, followed by their ratification and the deposit of the instruments of ratification with the UN Secretary-General, were the logical outcome of this process.

You held senior executive positions at the Ministry of the Environment at that time: in what areas did the ministry—and by extension, the entire Czech Republic—have the greatest comparative advantage over other EU candidate countries?

Even at the beginning of the 21st century, the Czech Republic was still driven by the fact that one of the catalysts for the societal changes of November 1989 was the effort to improve the state of the environment and the health of the population. Consequently, in the 1990s, a series of laws were enacted that contributed to embarking on a path of gradually remedying environmental damage, improving production technologies, and establishing or strengthening relatively high-quality specialized environmental institutions. All of this led to the Czech Republic being included in 1998 in the so-called first wave of candidate countries for accession to the European Union, alongside Poland and Hungary, for example, while Slovakia found itself in the second wave in 2000.

The Czech Republic’s efforts, manifested through investments in new legislation and the development of implementation and other capacities, were thus reflected, for example, in requests for transition periods to meet EU requirements. At the time of the signing of the Stockholm Convention, it received approval for two of the originally requested seven transition periods. However, for example, Poland secured 11 out of the 19 requested (two of which were related to compliance with the UN ECE CLRTAP and its protocols), Hungary secured only 4 out of the 9 requested, and Slovakia ultimately secured all 9 of the 9 requested. This alone speaks to the state of the environment in the Czech Republic and its readiness for EU accession.

Do you view the Stockholm Convention as “just one of many conventions,” or do you see it more as a specific, useful technical tool that actually helped the Czech Republic in the period from its signing through 2015? And why?

To many outside observers, the Stockholm Convention may seem like just one piece of the relatively extensive mosaic of multilateral environmental agreements today. However, the Stockholm Convention is a highly specialized treaty designed to restrict, reduce, or eliminate the discharge, emissions, and releases of persistent organic pollutants that have a significant harmful impact on human health and the environment. The global Stockholm Convention, as well as the preceding “European instrument,” have proven important primarily for the industrially advanced states and regions of Europe, including the Czech Republic, as well as for the rapidly growing economies of many countries in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. The Czech Republic, as a country with a very strong energy, metallurgical, engineering, and chemical sectors and an intensive agricultural sector, viewed the Protocol and the Convention as further incentives and challenges for its ambitious plans to remediate historical environmental damage, as well as for the prevention of such damage and the introduction of new environmentally friendly technologies. For this reason, at the 3rd Conference of the Parties to the Stockholm Convention in May 2006, the Czech Republic offered to host a regional center for the countries of Eastern and Central Europe in Brno, dedicated to capacity building and technology transfer, so that it could share its experience and know-how with other Parties to the Convention.

How do you assess the synergies between the BRS conventions?

I view the synergies between the BRS conventions very positively. Although negotiating these synergies was a challenging process both within UNEP and among the conventions’ governing bodies themselves, it has clearly led not only to more efficient functioning of the conventions’ mechanisms but, above all, to their implementation in a synergistic manner. The harmonization of scientific research, risk assessment, evaluation of compliance with commitments, and implementation tools, as well as a coordinated approach to the use of international and national financial instruments, serves as an inspiration for conventions in other thematic areas (biodiversity, environmental management, etc.). This also leads to more efficient use of the expert base and staffing of the conventions’ secretariats, as well as to a reduction in their operating costs. Thanks to this synergy, the chemical and waste agenda covered by the conventions is more widely respected not only by the contracting parties but also by the international community as a whole, which is reflected in the relatively strong position of this agenda within the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

How do you assess the overall shift in international environmental diplomacy between 2005 and 2015—that is, during the period that began before the financial crisis and ended just before the Paris Agreement? Were chemical conventions of this type on the rise, or were they overshadowed by the climate agenda?

Unfortunately, it must be acknowledged that the climate agenda usurped the leading position in the “spotlight” of the international environmental agenda, as it clearly reflected economic considerations and political preferences. For top politicians, including environment ministers, it was a means of raising their profile as champions of saving the Earth’s climate and of advancing national and regional interests. An advantage for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was the opportunity for direct communication with the UN General Assembly and thus for its influence in UNGA resolutions.

For the international chemical and waste agenda, the main platform was the high-level meetings of the convention bodies as well as the high-level meetings of the governing bodies of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Above all, these provided an opportunity to give greater consideration to this agenda at the UN General Assembly and in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and subsequently the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Through these processes, we succeeded in systematically raising the profile of this agenda, and above all in securing greater political and financial support for it (GEF, ODA, EU funds) and gradually implementing synergies among the conventions.

And on a more general note: from your perspective, how have the international environmental agenda and diplomacy evolved over the past 25 years? During this period, were multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) ever truly on the rise, or did other environmental issues overshadow them?

We must view the past twenty-five years of international environmental diplomacy as a reflection not only of global processes but also of domestic political developments in individual states, particularly those playing, if not a decisive, then at least an important role in international relations. These states are also capable of forming coalitions to advance their priorities in international relations, including environmental ones. It can be stated that over the past 25 years, the climate agenda has been at the forefront, followed by biodiversity and then the chemical and waste agendas.

In the last ten years, however, there has been a sense of “fatigue” regarding the climate agenda. This has been driven not only by domestic political changes—the rise of political representatives critical of the climate agenda, the growing financial demands of developing countries, and the “exhaustion” of traditional donors—but also by the functioning of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement—costly annual meetings of top-level bodies, mostly toothless decisions, the unenforceability of commitments, and the dismissal of the issue, including the withdrawal of contracting parties (see the changes and dramatic shifts in positions, e.g., by the U.S. over the past decades amid changing administrations).

In this context, the chemical and waste agenda has gained greater visibility because it is linked to specific production processes and products, as well as international trade. This trend was initiated by the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation in 2002, which set the goal of ensuring, by 2020, that chemicals are produced and used in ways that minimize negative impacts on human health and the environment. In 2006, the 9th Special Session of the UNEP Governing Council adopted the Strategic Approach to International Chemicals Management (SAICM). During the Czech Presidency of the European Union in February 2009, the 25th regular session of the UNEP Governing Council adopted a decision on institutional and substantive measures to address synergies among BRS conventions. These and other processes and initiatives in the field of chemicals have continued successfully (ICCM, Global Framework for Chemicals in 2023, Intergovernmental Science-Policy Panel on Chemicals, Waste and Pollution in 2025). I would venture to say that today this agenda is much more understandable to the average person thanks to its rationality and daily encounters with issues and problems falling under the BRS conventions, rather than the heated and sometimes even hysterical, negating discussions on climate change and the still unsuccessful efforts to halt the loss of biodiversity.

Do you see the concept of the so-called triple planetary crisis (see UNEA 5.2) as a step forward for the chemicals agenda?

Yes, it presents an opportunity to strengthen the implementation of actions in the field of chemicals. However, the concept of the triple planetary crisis cannot be successfully implemented without ensuring “environmental democracy,” i.e., without the existence of good governance, including good environmental governance. Over the past decade, we have witnessed a dramatic decline in political support for environmental protection, with the reversal of positive trends from the 1990s in particular—namely, manifestations of “environmental democracy” such as environmental impact assessments, strategic environmental assessments, and free access to environmental information. Geopolitical developments over the past five years, with all their armed conflicts, are bringing about a new dramatic deterioration of the environment in individual regions and, in essence, on a global scale as well. At the same time, laws protecting the environment in the event of armed conflicts are being ignored, and new sophisticated weapons systems are creating new dramatic risks, including in the use of chemical substances and the generation of hazardous waste.

A more general question regarding the role of UNEP, which serves as the institutional home for a wide range of environmental conventions, including the Stockholm Convention. Based on your own experience, how would you describe its position within the UN system—and why has it remained a program for decades rather than a full-fledged specialized agency like the WHO or the ILO?

UNEP’s position within the UN system has gradually strengthened, reaching its peak primarily between 1992 and 2016. It provides significant institutional support (secretariats) to UNEP members and parties to MEAs, including the BRS, as well as programmatic support in implementing strategic plans and decisions of the parties to the conventions. UNEP has built a relatively solid foundation for cooperation with other UN organizations, programs, and commissions, such as UNDP, UNIDO, UNESCO, WHO, ILO, and the CSD, as well as with international financial institutions (the World Bank, GEF, and regional development banks.

Despite the efforts of some member states, notably France, supported by the European Union, the idea of transforming UNEP from a program into a full-fledged organization within the UN failed to gain traction between 2003 and 2012. This was prevented by opposition from the permanent members of the Security Council (the U.S., Russia, and China) as well as some larger developing countries. The concern was not only that a World Environment Organization (WEO) or a United Nations Environment Organization (UNEO) would have the power to adopt binding—rather than merely recommendatory—decisions with implications beyond the environment, but also that contributions to the UNEP Environment Fund would shift from being voluntary to mandatory. However, the process of discussing the transformation was at least aided by the introduction of universal membership in UNEP’s governing bodies, the establishment of the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA) in 2013, and the holding of its first session in 2014.

Just to clarify. The WHO, established in 1946, succeeded the Health Organization of the League of Nations and the International Organization of Public Health (OIHP), which had been founded as early as 1907. The ILO became the successor organization to the International Labour Organization that existed within the League of Nations since 1919. So, in this case, the transition was almost automatic. UNEP was not established until 1974 as a result of the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm.